As a quartershare Albanian, I get a distant whiff of national pride at seeing so many flags flying across the world in recognition of the newly-declared independence of Kosovo. It’s somewhat of a giddy Wilsonian moment, with a nation laid low by war asserting that it is ready to participate in the optimism of the project of modernity. The Assembly of Kosovo, in its Declaration of Independence, has laid out a liberal and forward-looking affirmation of its independence that resists cheap absolutes and does its best to ease the blow to Serbia. It is, in all respects, a mature document, the product of a people who, in asserting their allegiance to their ethnic nationality, have at least attempted to transcend mere nationalism and to arrive at world integrationism.

But, of course, setting identity politics aside, the unvarnished harshness of difficult qusetions comes into view. I’m singularly happy for Kosovo; however, despite (in fact, beacuse of) the undiluted elation of a majority of ethnic Albanian Kosovars, a minority of Kosovar Serbs find themselves in a pretty miserable situation. Worse, the pigheadedness of Russia over Serbia’s authority in the matter threatens to drive a wedge into its already-fragile tensions with the West.

What’s encouraging is that Bush has showed some spine and realized that it’s the United States’s responsibility to stand behind the rebellious of the world. I’m thoroughly jaded by years of the Bush administration trotting out ‘freedom’ as a cudgel for neo-imperialist adventures. But despite their best attempts to denature the word, the core of its power remains: America is, and of right out to be, the guardian of the world’s oppressed. There isn’t an ounce of love lost between me and the neoconservative squatters occupying Foggy Bottom right now. But I’ll put pride aside and stand behind them in their recognition of Kosovo—which, in doing so, has reaffirmed America’s weight in the world, with several European states following the United States’s example.

My assessment of the situation is that the earlier and less ambiguously Kosovo is affirmed as a legitimate state, the more pressure it will be possible to exert on them to protect the Serb minorities. It’s clear that Kosovo is never going to be reintegrated into metropolitan Serbia, and failing to recognize their independence is likely only to lead to an enraged, broken semi-state. In return for Kosovo’s recognition, the expectation should come that they behave as a modern state. This, for both the Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo, is probably the most hopeful solution.